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Introduction
Despite tremendous medical advances, the instances of maternal and neo-natal mortality occur quite frequently, especially in developing countries. Each year, more than half a million women die from causes related to pregnancy and child-birth, 99% of which take place in developing countries (UNICEF, 2009) . Nearly 4 million newborns die within 28 days of birth, 98% of which occur in the low and the middle income developing countries. Most of these deaths are the result of direct causes-80% of maternal deaths are due to obstetric complications including post-partum haemorrhage, infections, eclampsia and prolonged or obstructed labor, while 86% of the newborn deaths are the direct results of the three main causes-severe infections, asphyxia and preterm births. Thus, a large number of maternal and neo-natal deaths can be avoided if skilled medical personnel are at hand, better care is provided during labor and delivery, and key drugs, equipments are available. Given that these resources are more easily available in a medical facility, delivering in a medical facility can make a significant dent in maternal and neo-natal deaths. Yet, proportion of women who deliver in medical facilities remains abysmally low in many developing countries. performing States has started narrowing. Importantly, the data indicates that the pre-treatment trends in institutional deliveries can't explain these results. Further, I also show that there has been no differential change in either availability or access to medical facilities in favor of the low performing States over this time period. In addition, I find that in the low performing States, proportion of women delivering in government medical facilities has gone up dramatically, while proportion of women delivering in private medical facilities has actually gone down. This is consistent with the eligibility criteria and magnitude of incentives. These findings increase our confidence that the changes in institutional deliveries are more likely to be driven by JSY. The evidence on whether women from disadvantaged households benefit is mixed though, and which women benefit differ between the low performing and the high performing States.
This paper provides yet another example of a CCT program, which have become a preferred policy tool to realize social-welfare objectives of the government, especially across the developing world.
Researchers have extensively analyzed Oportunidades in Mexico (previously known as PROGRESA), Almost every CCT mentioned above had significant impacts on school enrollment and attendance (See Schultz (2004) for Mexico; Attanasio et al. (2005) for Colombia; Maluccio and Flores (2005) for Nicaragua; Galasso (2006) for Chile; Schady and Araujo (2008) for Ecuador). The evidence from CCTs in Pakistan (Chaudhury and Parajulu, 2006) and Cambodia (Filmer and Schady, 2008) suggests that these effects can be very large. The program effects may not be identical for all students. Schultz (2004) shows that the effects of the Mexican CCT program on enrollment were significant only for the children who were enrolled in grade 6 at the baseline. This is not surprising given the fact that proceeding from grade 6 to grade 7 implies transition from primary to lower secondary school and that's where the bulk of the drop-outs occur 2 . The evidence also shows that the largest program effects are for the households which are more disadvantaged at the baseline (Filmer and Schady, 2008; Glewwe and Olinto, 2004; . But evidence on impact of CCTs on learning outcomes is disappointing (Ponce and Bedi, 2010; 2000) , Filmer and Schady; 2009).
Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua, Bono de Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador, Program of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) in
As far as health indicators are concerned, the evidence shows that CCTs in Honduras (Morris et al., 2004) , Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2005) , Jamaica (Levy and Ohls, 2007) and Nicaragua (Macours et al., 2012) had positive and significant effects on health centre visits by children, while the CCTs in Mexico (Gertler, 2000) , and Chile (Galasso, 2006) did not have much effect. Evidence on impact of vaccination and immunization is also mixed. Some programs have no effect (Barham, 2005) , while some programs do (Barham and Maluccio, 2009 ). In some cases, effects are found only for specific age-groups and specific vaccinations (Morris et al., 2004; Barham and Maluccio, 2009). Gertler (2004) and Behrman & Hoddinott (2005) Macours et al. (2012) show that the CCTs can have positive effects on cognitive outcomes for children in the beneficiary households 3 .
The empirical work in recent years has attempted to understand the contribution of specific elements of the CCT program package to the outcome of interest. These studies indicate that changing the timing of receiving transfers can yield effects over and above the standard payment pattern (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011) ; there is a possibility of sharply diminishing marginal response to the transfer size (Filmer and Schady, 2011) ; conditionalities do matter in the sense that they increase the desired outcome from the policymaker's point of view but in the process, may impose costs on non-compliers (de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011; Baird et al., 2011) ; gender of the recipient may not matter when it comes to the cash transfers which are conditional (Akresh et al., 2012) . This paper contributes to this growing literature by analyzing a unique CCT program which incentivizes pregnant women to deliver in medical facilities. The program has become one of the largest CCT programs in the world but surprisingly, not much is known about its effect on institutional deliveries. The findings in this paper assume even more significance given the fact that India contributes one-fifth to the global maternal deaths. And hence, success of this program can have important implications for achieving the millennium development goal of reducing the maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters. 3 The Mexican CCT program remains the most analyzed program as far as the effects of CCTs on health indicators are concerned. In addition to the references mentioned above, also see Barber and Gertler, 2008; Fernald et al., 2008; Barber, 2009; Barber and Gertler, 2009; Barber and Gertler, 2010;  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the background and the description of the JSY program. Section II describes data, while section III discusses the empirical strategy.
Section IV has the key results, and section V provides robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
Background & the Program

Background
Despite India's rapid economic progress and rising expenditure on public health, the health-related indicators have not shown much progress 4 . This has prompted many to believe that India's public health system has failed to deliver (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009) It was on this backdrop that the `National Rural Health Mission' (henceforth, NRHM) was launched by the Government of India (GoI) in April 2005 7 . One of the major objectives of the NRHM has been 4 As per the 2002-04 and 2007-08 waves of a large national sample survey (details later), proportion of women receiving complete pre-natal check-up increased from 16.5% to 18%. Proportion of women delivering in a health facility went up from 40% to 47%. Finally, proportion of children in the age-group 12-23 months and fully immunized, increased from 46% to 54% (IIPS, 2010) . In the meanwhile, public expenditure on health (Center and State combined) increased by 214% between 2000-01 and 2009-10 (See Economic Survey of India, Ministry of Finance, Government of India for 2005-06 and 2011-12) . 5 See Chaudhury et al. (2006 ), Das et. al (2007 , Das and Hammer (2007) , and Muralidharan et al. (2011) , for discussion on problems afflicting Indian public health system. 6 
Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)
JSY is a conditional cash transfer scheme-a woman is paid money if she delivers her baby in a medical facility-in government health facilities, like Sub-centers (SCs), Primary health centers Initially, the eligibility rules to obtain monetary incentives under the JSY were uniform across the low performing and the high performing States. According to these rules, only those women who were of 19 years of age or above, and belonged to the below poverty line (henceforth, BPL) families, were eligible for the benefit 12 . The benefit was restricted to the first two live births. In the low performing States, women were eligible for benefit for third birth as well, provided the beneficiary opts for sterilization immediately after delivery. The monetary incentives were also identical in the low performing and the high performing States as far as rural areas were concerned. Details are described in table 2. 8 see (NRHM, 2009 ) for details about the goals and objectives, administration, and funding pattern of the NRHM. 9 District is an administrative unit below the State. Larger districts are divided into sub-divisions. A block is an administrative unit below the district/ district sub-division. 10 A SC is the most peripheral health facility and first point of contact between the primary health care system and the community. A PHC is above the SC. It acts as a referral unit for 6 SCs. It is the first point of contact between the community and a medical officer. A CHC serves as a referral for 4 PHCs. It is manned by medical specialists and paramedics. The District hospitals are at the highest level within a district. See appendix 1 for more details. 11 These States are the ones indicated in top panel of table 1. 12 'Below Poverty Line' (BPL) households are identified by local governments through periodic census of households, under the directions from the Ministry of Rural development. The census has been carried out in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2011 . The households identified as 'BPL' households are supposed to get the 'BPL' card which entitles them to benefit from plethora of welfare schemes.
These eligibility rules were deemed to be too strict, especially in the low performing States, and hence, new guidelines were issued in late 2006 13 . According to these new guidelines, in the low performing States, 1) all pregnant women, irrespective of age, poverty status and number of births, are eligible for benefit under the JSY if they deliver in a government medical facility;
2) only the women from the BPL households and women from the Scheduled Castes (SC) /Scheduled Tribes (ST) households (whether above or below the BPL) are eligible for the benefit under the JSY if they deliver in an accredited private medical facility.
In case of the high performing States, 1) only those pregnant women who are aged 19 years and above, and belong to the BPL households, are eligible for cash assistance;
2) in case of the SC or ST households, all women irrespective of their poverty status, are eligible for cash assistance, provided they are above the age of 19. Cash assistance is limited to only two live births, even for the women belonging to the SC and ST.
Thus, these revised guidelines meant that any pregnant woman in a low performing State is eligible for the benefit under the JSY, while age, poverty status and number of births still matter in the high performing States. In addition, the amount of financial assistance was also modified (table 2). The beneficiaries in the low performing States are now given Rs. 1400 if the woman lives in rural area, and Rs. 1000 if the woman lives in urban area ($25.45 and $18 .18 using Rs. 55/$ as exchange rate).
For the beneficiaries in the high performing States, the corresponding amounts are Rs. 700 and Rs. 600 ($12.73 and $10.91) . The modified monetary incentive in a low performing State is quite substantial-around 63% of the poverty line expenditure cut-off, and 68% of average delivery cost in a government medical facility 14 .
Role of Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) in JSY 15
13 The exact month could not be confirmed. 14 Poverty line estimates have been taken from Tendulkar Committee report (Radhakrishna et al, 2009 ). Delivery cost has been taken from the national report of the third round of District Level Health Survey i.e. DLHS 3 (IIPS, 2010). 15 http://www.mohfw.nic.in/NRHM/asha.htm Appointment of Accredited Social Health Activists, ASHAs (which literally means hope in Hindi) is an important element of NRHM. An ASHA is envisaged as a link between the public health system and the local community, and a first port of call for health-related demands of the disadvantaged sections of the populations. An ASHA is selected among the women residents of the village in the age-group of 25-45 years and who have been educated at least up to class 8. As per the norms, there should be one ASHA for every 1000 population. An ASHA has been assigned important responsibilities in the context of maternal and child health-identifying pregnant women in the community, making sure that these women receive complete prenatal care through Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), escort the woman to the health center when the woman is in labor or faces complications, facilitate delivery in a medical facility, and ensure post-natal care for the woman and the new-born, including immunization 16 .
As per the NRHM, the ASHAs were initially appointed only in the low performing States 17 . Further, the ASHAs don't receive a fixed salary but instead receive performance-based payments. An ASHA in rural area can get maximum of Rs. 600 ($10.91 using Rs. 55/$ as exchange rate) per delivery, which includes Rs. 150 if she escorts the woman to the facility, Rs. 250 for transport, and Rs. 200 as an incentive 18 . If the ASHA doesn't arrange the transport, she won't receive Rs. 250 meant for transport. An ASHA in urban area gets only Rs. 200, the incentive amount. Further, the incentive payment for an ASHA is available only in case of deliveries in government facilities, and not in case of accredited private facilities.
Disbursement of Cash Incentive to the Mothers
According to the guidelines, the financial assistance to the mother should be disbursed at the medical facility itself, in one installment before her discharge from the medical facility. The amount would be paid only to the mother and not to any other person. The disbursement should be done either by an ANM or an ASHA. If a woman goes to her mother's place for delivery or to a district / State hospital, the amount of assistance would be based on the place of residency. The expectant 16 An Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) is a key functionary in rural health system. Her main responsibilities include maternal and child health, with special focus on antenatal care and delivery care. Over time, other functions, such as family planning, immunization, sanitation, infectious disease prevention etc. have been added to her tasks (See Mavalankar & Vora, 2008) . ANMs are stationed at SCs and PHCs. 17 Due to pressure from the high performing States, the scheme was extended to these States in 2008 i.e. beyond the period covered in our sample. 18 The exact break-up differs marginally across States. mothers are supposed to carry a referral slip from ANM, which would indicate their place of residency.
In order to receive benefits, `Below Poverty Line' (BPL) or caste certificates (for women belonging to SC/ST categories) are required (wherever applicable). If the BPL certification is not available through a legally constituted process, the beneficiary can still avail the benefit on certification by the local council (such as village council), elected representatives, revenue authorities, provided the delivery takes place in a government institution. But the benefit available under the JSY, when a BPL woman delivers in an accredited private hospital, can be obtained only by producing a regular BPL card whose number etc. has to be quoted in the discharge card issued by the private institution 19 .
Data
Our empirical The survey covers all districts in the country. A systematic, multi-stage stratified sampling design is adopted, and primary sampling units (villages in rural areas/ wards in urban areas) are selected with probability proportion to size (PPS) sampling. The data is collected through structured questionnaires to obtain relevant information about the sampled household, married women in the age group of 15-44 years in the sampled household, husbands of these women, and the sampled villages. The types of questionnaires canvassed are not uniform across the survey rounds-village questionnaire was not canvassed in the 1998-99 wave, while questionnaire for husbands was 
Empirical Strategy
Analyzing Impact of the JSY on Institutional Deliveries
The discussion so far reveals that JSY was introduced throughout the entire country simultaneously. But the eligibility criteria was substantially relaxed and monetary incentive was hiked considerably in the low performing States towards the end of 2006, while keeping them unchanged in the high performing States. Similarly, the ASHAs were appointed only in the low performing States, which would potentially reduce the anxiety and hassles for the woman and her family associated with approaching a medical facility and receiving incentive payment postdelivery. Hence, I hypothesize that, other things being equal, the low performing States should witness a larger increase in the institutional deliveries as compared to the high performing States.
Thus, our empirical strategy compares changes in the proportion of institutional deliveries between the low performing and the high performing States before and after JSY was launched.
I consider the following regression specification, Y = β0 + β1*LPS + β2*Y2005 + β3*Y2006 + β4*Y2007 + β5*Y2008 + β6*(LPS*Y2005) + β7*(LPS*Y2006) + β8*(LPS*Y2007) + β9*(LPS*Y2008) + X'*α + ε, performing States relative to the high performing States, these coefficients would be positive. If the effect of the scheme grows over a period of time, the coefficients on the interaction terms for later years would be higher. X captures other woman and household level controls. The controls for women include whether the woman and her husband are literate, total number of pregnancies the woman had, age at the time of last pregnancy, whether the woman received any prenatal care, whether the woman had any problem during pregnancy. The controls at the household level include caste, religion, measure of standard of living, and whether the household is in rural area (if applicable).
Deliveries in Public vs. Private Medical Facilities
JSY incentives for women are available for deliveries in government facilities and only accredited private medical facilities. No benefits are available for delivery in the private medical facilities which are not accredited. Further, the ASHAs are not supposed to receive any incentives in case of delivery in a private facility, accredited or not. Low number and limited geographical spread of accredited private facilities, combined with the above-mentioned JSY conditionalities suggest that the JSY would reduce the proportion of deliveries conducted in private facilities, and increase the same in government facilities 22 . I test this hypothesis using the identical regression specification as above with the exception of dependent variables, which in this case, would be (1) delivery in government facilities, and (2) delivery in private facilities. As before, the coefficients on the interaction terms, 'year*LPS dummy' indicate differential change in the government/ private institutional deliveries in the low performing States compared to the changes in the high performing States in that particular year, relative to the baseline.
Differential Effect of the Program
The JSY is also expected to benefit more to relatively disadvantaged households. The following regression specification compares changes in proportion of institutional deliveries among women from disadvantaged households relative to the women in other households, separately for the low performing and the high performing States: Y = β0 + β1*Z + β2*Y2005 + β3*Y2006 + β4*Y2007 + β5*Y2008 + β6*(Z*Y2005) + β7*(Z*Y2006) + β8*(Z*Y2007) + β9*(Z*Y2008) + X'*α + ε,
where 'Z' indicates whether household belongs to the disadvantaged category (i.e. it resides in rural area or it belongs to SC/ST communities or it is 'poor' or the woman has never attended school).
The survey does not identify poor or BPL households. Hence, I use wealth index as the proxy for relative poverty of the household, i.e. households with 'low' and 'medium' wealth index are poorer than the households with 'high' wealth index 24 . The coefficients on the interaction terms, 'year*Z'
indicate differential change in the institutional deliveries among disadvantaged households relative to the changes in rest of the households in that particular year, relative to the baseline. If the disadvantaged women benefit more, then the coefficient on these interaction terms would be positive and statistically significant.
Pre-program Trends in Institutional Deliveries
Even if I find that there is differential increase in institutional deliveries in the low performing
States after the launch of the JSY, it may or may not be attributed to the JSY. The possibility of convergence suggests that even in the absence of the program, the low performing States might have experienced faster increase in institutional deliveries, because the level of institutional deliveries was quite low in these States before the launch of the program. In order to alleviate this concern, I look at the trends in institutional deliveries before the launch of the JSY, in the low performing and the high performing States. If the trends are indeed uniform, then the differential trends after the launch of the program can more confidently be attributed to the program.
To check whether the trends were uniform, I consider the following regression specification, where 1995 is the omitted year (baseline): Y = β0 + β1*LPS + β2*Y1996 + β3*Y1997 + β4*Y1998 + β5*Y1999 + β6*Y2000 + β7*Y2001 + β8*Y2002 + β9*Y2003 + β10*Y2004 + β11*(LPS*Y1996) + β11*(LPS*Y1997) + β11*(LPS*Y1998) + β12*(LPS*Y1999) + β13*(LPS*Y2000) + β14*(LPS*Y2001) + β16*(LPS*Y2002) + β17*(LPS*Y2003) + β18*(LPS*Y2004) + X'*α + ε,
In the above specification, I use data from the survey rounds conducted before the JSY was launched, i.e. 1998-99 and 2002-04 waves. If the trends in institutional deliveries were indeed uniform across the two groups, the coefficients on the interaction terms would be zero.
Availability & Access to Medical Facilities
As mentioned previously, JSY is a part of the NRHM, which is a broad program with special focus on the low performing States. Creation of medical facilities is an important element of the NRHM. Since it is the low performing States where infrastructure gaps are more severe, more facilities would be created in the low performing States. This would mean that availability and access to medical facilities might change differentially in the low performing States, which would result in more type of medical facility, while accessibility means whether the facility is accessible throughout the year. I estimate the following difference-in-difference regression, Y = β0 + β1*LPS + β2*POST + β3*(LPS*POST) + ε,
where the dependent variable Y is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a) the village has a particular medical facility, and b) if the village has access to these medical facilities. 'LPS' is a dummy variables indicating if the village is in a low performing State. It captures the pre-existing differences between the low performing and the high performing State. I expect it's coefficient to be negative. 'POST' equals 1 for villages covered in 2007-08 round. It captures the change in availability and access to medical facilities in the high performing States relative to the baseline. The variable of interest is the interaction term 'LPS * POST', which captures differential trends in the dependent variable in the low performing states. Presence of a differential change will make it difficult to disentangle the effect of monetary incentive from easier access to medical facilities, on institutional deliveries. 
Results
Annual Treatment Effects
Deliveries in Public vs. Private Medical Facilities
As discussed in section 3.2, the JSY is likely to have different consequences for deliveries in public and private medical facilities. Tables 7 and 8 with 'medium' wealth, and to some extent for households with 'low' wealth. Column 2 shows that proportion of institutional deliveries has been almost constant in urban areas, while it has grown in rural areas. As a result, the gap between rural and urban areas has narrowed down. Column 3 suggests similar trends-institutional deliveries growing at the same rate for SC/ST and non-SC/ST households, and as a consequence, the gap in institutional deliveries between the two groups has remained more or less constant.
Differential Effects of JSY
Threats to Validity
Pre-treatment Trends
The key question is: Can the trends observed in institutional deliveries be attributed to JSY? The results for specification III are presented in table 9, with year 1995 as the base period. I only present the coefficients corresponding to the interaction terms. 
Availability and Access to Medical Facilities
As mentioned in section 3.5, another potential concern is the differential change in availability and The variable of interest is the interaction term 'LPS * POST', which captures differential trends in the dependent variable in the low performing states. The results indicate that except for the child development centre (anganwadi), there has been no differential change in the availability and the access of any other medical facility. This suggests that the differential increase in the proportion of institutional deliveries is unlikely to be driven by increased availability and access of medical facilities.
To summarize, our empirical analysis shows that institutional deliveries have increased more in the low performing States compared to the high performing States after JSY was modified. This increase is not driven by pre-existing trends in institutional deliveries or by differential changes in availability or access to medical facilities. Interestingly, the overall increase in institutional deliveries consists of increase in deliveries in public facilities and decline in deliveries in private facilities.
Conclusion
Instances of maternal and neo-natal mortality occur quite frequently, especially in developing countries. It is suggested that delivering a child in a medical facility can reduce such occurrences substantially. This paper analyzes a unique conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, Janani
Suraksha Yojana (JSY) in India, which provides cash incentives to women if they deliver in a government or an accredited private medical facility, and to the local community health workers if they facilitate delivery in government facilities. I exploit the fact that the eligibility criteria were relaxed and magnitude of cash incentives were hiked only in the 'low performing' States, and not in the 'high performing' States. Further, the community health workers who received incentives for facilitating deliveries were appointed only in the low performing States. Results show that after the launch of JSY, the gap between the low performing and the high performing States widened marginally. But trend reversed after the modification in program design, with the low performing
States showing much higher increase in the institutional deliveries than the high performing States.
These trends are neither driven by trends in institutional deliveries before the JSY was initiated nor by differential change in availability or access to medical facilities in the low performing States. This increases our confidence that these trends are driven by monetary incentives under the JSY. These results are encouraging given the fact that India alone contributes one-fifth to the tally of global maternal deaths.
The overall increase in institutional deliveries in the low performing States masks the divergent trends in public and private health facilities. I find that institutional deliveries in public facilities have increased while the private medical facilities have seen their share going down. Further, women from relatively disadvantaged households have not necessarily done better. Women from households with low and medium levels of wealth are doing better than their counterparts in households with 'high' wealth levels, in both, the low performing and the high performing States post-2006. But women from the rural areas are doing better than the ones in urban areas only in the high performing States and not in the low performing States. Moreover, women from the SC/ST households have not experienced higher increase in institutional deliveries relative to the non-SC/ST households in both the groups despite being more disadvantaged. This suggests that more efforts would be needed to make sure that this innovative CCT reaches to the disadvantaged households.
More work need to be done to assess this program further. Its effects on final outcomes-maternal and neo-natal or infant mortality remain to be analyzed. Further, as discussed, the effect of JSY is a combination of effect of providing incentives to women, and effect of providing incentives to the community health workers. It would be instructive know the contribution of each of the two types of incentives to the changes in intermediate and final outcomes, especially from the point of view of designing a program which delivers and is also cost effective.
Appendix 1: Public Health Facilities in India
Sub-center (SC):
SC is the most peripheral and first contact point between the primary health care system and the community. The norm suggests that there should be one SC for every 5000 population in plain areas, and for every 3000 population in hilly/ tribal/ difficult areas. Each SC is manned by one Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) and one Male Health Worker. SCs are assigned tasks relating to interpersonal communication in order to bring about behavioral change and provide services in relation to maternal and child health, family welfare, nutrition, immunization, diarrhea control and control of communicable diseases programs. The SCs are provided with basic drugs for minor ailments needed for taking care of essential health needs of men, women and children.
Primary health center (PHC):
PHC is the first contact point between village community and the Medical Officer. As per the norms, there should be one PHC for every 30,000 population in plain areas and for every 20,000
population in hilly/ difficult areas. The PHCs were envisaged to provide an integrated curative and preventive health care to the rural population with emphasis on preventive and promotive aspects of health care. At present, a PHC is manned by a Medical Officer supported by 14 paramedical and other staff. It acts as a referral unit for 6 SCs. It has 4-6 beds for patients. The activities of PHCs involve curative, preventive, primitive and Family Welfare Services.
Community health center (CHC):
As per the norms, there should be one CHC for every 120,000 population in case of plain areas and for every 80,000 population in case of difficult terrain. A CHC is at the block level. It is manned by four medical specialists i.e. Surgeon, Physician, Gynecologist and Pediatrician supported by 21 paramedical and other staff. It has 30 beds with one OT, X-ray, Labor Room and Laboratory facilities. It serves as a referral centre for 4 PHCs and also provides facilities for obstetric care and specialist consultations.
Sub-district hospitals:
(CHC) hospitals, and act as First Referral Units (FRU) for the block population in which they are geographically located. They receive referred cases from neighboring CHCs, PHCs and SCs. They form an important link between SCs, PHCs and CHCs on one end, and District Hospitals on other end. The bed-strength of these hospitals can vary from 31 to 100.
District Hospital:
District Hospital is a hospital at the secondary referral level responsible for a district. Every district is expected to have a district hospital. As the population of a district is variable, the bed strength also varies from 75 to 500 beds depending on the size, terrain and population of the district. Dependent Variable: Whether the child was delivered at a medical facility?
Individual Controls: Whether woman and her husband are literate; total pregnancies; age of the woman at the time of last birth; whether she received antenatal care; if she had any problem during pregnancy; Dependent Variables: Column (1) Whether the child was delivered at a public medical facility?
(1a, 1b); Column (2) Whether the child was delivered at a private medical facility? (2a, 2b);
Individual Controls: Whether woman and her husband are literate; total pregnancies; age of the woman at the time of last birth; whether she received antenatal care; if she had any problem during pregnancy; Household Controls: Caste; religion; standard of living index; whether the household is in rural area (for 1a, 1b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Household Controls: Caste; religion; standard of living index; whether the household is in rural area (for 1a, 1b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Dependent Variable: Whether the child was delivered at a medical facility?
Individual Controls: Whether woman and her husband are literate; total pregnancies; age of the woman at the time of last birth; whether she received antenatal care; if she had any problem during pregnancy;
Household Controls: Caste; religion; standard of living index; whether the household is in rural area (for 1a, 1b) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: The figure is based on the regression of a dummy variable for institutional delivery, on year dummies from 1996 to 2008, a dummy for the low performing States, and the interaction variables between year dummies and dummy for the low performing States. The regression also includes controls for women and households. 1995 is the baseline year. The estimation includes only urban observations. 
